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Thomas Hobbes’s place in the history of modern political thought is somewhat curious. Hobbes 
is perhaps the most ‘political’ of all political philosophers, focusing as he did primarily on the 
origins, nature, and authority of the state as an “artificial person”.1 Yet the period ca.1650-1800 
witnessed a notable expansion of the scope of the political, with an increased attentiveness to how 
broader social and economic forces exert themselves on individuals in such ways as to render them 
susceptible to ‘government’, understood in a Foucauldian sense as “the conduct of conduct”.2 As 
Foucault argued, sociability (socialité) – how individuals coexist with one another – became a new 
matter to “police” from the seventeenth century onwards.3 Hobbes is implicated in this turn away 
from a narrow focus on the state and its monopolization of disciplinary power, because to a 
considerable extent it was undertaken to confront a question that Hobbes had himself made 
pressing – but one to which his own political theory was held to offer an inadequate solution.4 This 
was the problem, in Kant’s memorable formulation, of “unsocial sociability”.5 By what means 
might human beings, with all their antisocial characteristics, be induced to exercise the kinds of 
                                                          
1 Quentin Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State,” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 1–29.  
2 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 48. 
3 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory and Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, trans. Graham Burchell 
and ed. Michael Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 326.  
4 John Robertson, “Sacred History and Political Thought: Neopolitan Responses to the Problem of Sociability,” 
Historical Journal 56 (2013): 1–6. 
5 Jerome B. Schneewind, “Good Out of Evil: Kant and the Idea of Unsocial Sociability,” in Kant's Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide, eds. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, and James Schmidt (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 94–111. 
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self-control required to make large-scale, peaceful, and even prosperous societies possible?6 Few 
eighteenth-century philosophers exhibited sustained interest in Hobbes’s theory of the state; but 
their engagement with the problem of sociability to which that theory was intended as a solution 
only “intensified and ramified” as the decades passed, as the example of Kant illustrates.7  
A notable characteristic of much eighteenth-century moral and political philosophy is its 
attentiveness to our radical sensitivity to the evaluative judgments of observing others.8 Subjectivity 
is, on this line of thinking, the product of intersubjective processes to which we are all susceptible 
because of our deep desire for recognition. Political, critical and moral theorists have in recent years 
drawn attention to recognition as a fundamental human need, essential to our well-being, and to 
misrecognition as symptomatic of unjust societies and generative of social conflict and strife. Such 
theorists agree that recognition first acquired prominence in eighteenth-century philosophy – 
whether in the writings of Hegel or Rousseau.9 This is, however, mistaken: for all that they may 
have done so in unusually powerful and innovative ways, Rousseau and Hegel were intervening in 
an ongoing conversation about the desire for recognition and its implications that they did not 
initiate. Insofar as they, like Kant, understood this conversation to be a part of a broader debate 
over the problem of sociability, its terms were set by Hobbes. As István Hont observes, it was 
Hobbes who first claimed that the fundamental problems of politics all stem “from the politics of 
recognition”.10 As much recent scholarship has emphasised, sociability was a problem for Hobbes in 
large part because the desire for recognition generated a further desire: for society – the realization 
of which it nonetheless frustrated.11  
If one accepts Hobbes’s interpretation of the desire for esteem as by its very nature 
generative only of mutual non-recognition and conflict, then the problem of sociability appears 
susceptible only of Hobbes’s political solution – one reliant upon both fear of punishment and the 
                                                          
6 For a conspectus of the scholarship on the post-Hobbesian sociability debate, see Eva Piirimäe and Alexander 
Schmidt, “Introduction: Between Morality and Anthropology – Sociability in Enlightenment Thought,” History of 
European Ideas 41 (2015): 571–588. 
7 Robertson, “Sacred History,” 6. 
8 Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961).   
9 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995); Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). For the pre-Hegelian history of recognition, see now Axel Honneth, Anerkennung: Eine 
europäische Ideensgeschichte (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018); and Risto Saarinen, Recognition and Religion: A Historical and Systematic 
Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
10 István Hont, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, eds. Béla Kapossay and Michael 
Sonenscher (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 11–12. 
11 Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Julia E. 
Cooper, “Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes,” The Review of Politics 
72 (2010): 241–269; Paul Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind: Sociability and the Theory of the State from Hobbes to Smith (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 27–66. 
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political re-education of subjects.12 If, however, the desire for esteem opens us up to the evaluative 
opinions of our neighbours in such ways as induce us to exercise the self-control required for 
sociable living, then the production of disciplined and law-abiding citizens is not (and cannot be) 
the exclusive preserve and achievement of state politics. In what follows, we illustrate how two of 
Hobbes’s earliest critics, who (like Hobbes) operated within the framework of Protestant natural 
jurisprudence – Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke – challenged his interpretation of the 
consequences of the desire for esteem in precisely this way.13 While all three philosophers agreed 
that the desire for recognition makes men susceptible to (re-)education, Pufendorf and Locke 
emphasised that the socio-psychological processes that lead people to adopt the norms of sociable 
behaviour are not directly controlled by the sovereign. Both offered alternative explanations of 
how human beings become sociable, morally accountable creatures by living together in society, 
without invoking Hobbes’s “mortal God” or rehabilitating the doctrine of natural human 
benevolence and sociability. The focus on esteem and recognition in post-Hobbesian natural 
jurisprudence has, until recently, been ignored by scholars.14  In what follows, we will recover the 
intellectual framework in which the questions of recognition and non-recognition were initially 
formulated in post-Hobbesian natural law jurisprudence. This shift of focus will reveal the 
significant continuities between the responses to the problem of sociability generated from within 
Protestant natural jurisprudence, and those developed by eighteenth-century philosophers from 




Hobbes: Recognition, Inequality, and the Problem of Sociability 
 
                                                          
12 For the place of both fear and education in Hobbes’s solution to the problems generated by the desire for 
recognition, see Eva Odzuck, “War by Other Means? Incentives for Power Seekers in Thomas Hobbes’s Political 
Philosophy,” Review of Politics 81 (2019): 21–46. 
13 Building on Heikki Haara and Tim Stuart-Buttle, “Beyond Justice: Pufendorf and Locke on the Desire for Esteem,” 
Political Theory 47 (2019): 699–723. 
14 For notable exceptions see James Tully “Governing Conduct”, in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
Edmund Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12–71; Kari Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf on Natural 
Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71 (2010): 39–62; Tim Stuart-Buttle, “‘A 
Burthen Too Heavy for Humane Sufferance’: Locke on Reputation”, History of Political Thought 38 (2017): 644–680; 
Heikki Haara and Aino Lahdenranta, “Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and 
Moral Conduct”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (2018): 19–37; Heikki Haara, Pufendorf’s Theory of Sociability: Passions, 
Habits and Social Order (Cham: Springer, 2018), 99–136; Haara and Stuart-Buttle, “Beyond Justice”; Tim Stuart-Buttle, 
From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Cicero and Visions of Humanity from Locke to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University 




In his first published foray into political philosophy, Hobbes launched a forthright assault on 
Aristotle’s theory of natural human sociability which, he claimed, had misled all subsequent “writers 
on public Affairs”.15 Aristotle’s conclusion that “the Human is an animal born fit [aptum natum] for 
Society, – in the Greek phrase, ζῶον πολιτικόν” was the result of a “superficial view of human 
nature”: one that misconstrued “the causes why men seek each other’s company and enjoy 
associating with each other”.16 Importantly, Hobbes accepted two constitutive elements of 
Aristotle’s theory: that men by nature do desire society with others; and that they do so to secure 
goods that are not confined to those required for self-preservation and physical well-being. Yet 
Hobbes argued that Aristotle’s claim that “the human being is a political animal” by nature (zoon 
politikon) was unwarranted, and predicated on a fundamental misunderstanding of the “Good” of 
“the mind” that leads men to seek company.17 On Hobbes’s interpretation, Aristotle assumed that 
it was a natural love of others – a desire for friendship – that gives rise to society, and generates 
relationships characterized by reciprocity and an acknowledgement of mutual equality. Political 
society, in turn, allows men to consolidate these bonds of fellowship in the polis.18 For Hobbes, in 
contrast, society “is a product of love of self, not of love of friends”. The “good” of the mind we 
seek in society is not friendship, but “reputation and honour” – which is a form of power. All 
mental pleasure, Hobbes argued, “is either Glory (or a good opinion of oneself), or ultimately 
relates to glory”.19 
 Friendship is predicated upon an assumption of equality by the parties involved, and 
it is theoretically available to all. If, as Hobbes held Aristotle to maintain, “man naturally loved his 
fellow man, there is no reason why everyone would not love everyone equally as equally men”. Yet 
it is evident that, in practice, individuals “seek the company of men whose society is more 
prestigious and useful to him than to others”. This proves, Hobbes argued, that “what we are 
primarily after” from others is the mental good of “honour”, along with the satisfaction of our 
“sensual” pleasures. Unlike friendship, “honour” assumes inequality between men and is by 
definition not available to all. It is a positional good, which “is nothing if everyone has it, since it 
                                                          
15 Here Hobbes underplayed the nuance of medieval and early-modern discussions of sociability: see Annabel Brett, 
Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2011). 
16 Thomas, Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 1.2. 
17 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, IX.9, 1169b16-23; Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a3.  
18 Nicholas Gooding and Kinch Hoekstra argue that Hobbes took issue primarily with Aristotle’s theory of friendship 
in the Nichomachean Ethics (Books VIII-IX), rather than with his account of man as zoon politicon in the Politics: “Hobbes 
and Aristotle on the Foundation of Political Science,” in Hobbes’s On the Citizen: A Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass 
and Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 31–50. 
19 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.2.  
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consists in comparison and pre-eminence”.20 Recognition-seeking is, it follows, a zero-sum game. 
It stimulates competition and conflict and gives rise to relationships characterized by dominion 
and subjugation – by flattery, not friendship.21 By substituting the desire for recognition for 
Aristotle’s natural love of others (philia), Hobbes was able to show that the desire that leads us to 
seek society necessarily precludes its realization. Unlike in The Elements of Law and De cive, in 
Leviathan Hobbes does not explicitly claim that glory is the most foundational human passion, and 
maintains that only some individuals (rather than all) are glory-seekers. Nevertheless, even in 
Leviathan the problems generated by glory-seeking underpin Hobbes’s claims regarding the 
necessity of the sovereign state for peaceful cooperation, mutual trust and sociability.22 The 
competition for recognition, rather than for scarce material resources is the most important cause 
of quarrel in mankind’s natural condition, as prideful individuals endeavour to extort a good from 
others (esteem) that they are unwilling to reciprocate.23 Every man desires affirmation of their value 
from others – even if, due to temperamental differences, this desire is stronger in some (the proud) 
than others (the more modest). Yet every man considers himself wiser than others – which 
ironically “proveth rather that men are in that point equall, rather than unequall” – and thus craves 
an affirmation of his superiority that others are disinclined to offer (unless coerced to do so).24   
  Society relies, as a condition of possibility, upon its members’ mutual 
acknowledgement of their natural equality as men: equality is for Hobbes a political, rather than a 
physical, metaphysical or ontological imperative.25 In their natural condition, (some) men’s pride 
precludes them from this act, thereby generating a “contest for dominion”, whereas “it is necessary 
for the obtaining of peace” that all members of a community “be esteemed as equal” (or “accounted by 
nature equal to one another”).26 Only thus will they recognize their obligation to play by the same rules 
as everyone else. In their immiserated natural condition, recognition-seeking generates unanimity 
on one point alone: that a superior authority is required, to whose laws every individual recognizes 
himself beholden. Only “men’s mutual fear”, stimulated primarily by the competition and violence 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Daniel J. Kapust, That Glib and Oily Art: Flattery and the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 64–95. 
22 For differences and continuities in Hobbes’s treatment of glory across his works, see Gabriella Slomp, “Hobbes on 
Glory and Civil Strife,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 181–198. 
23 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part 1. Chap. 13; cf. 
1.17, p. 258; see Arish Abizadeh, “Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory,” American Political Science 
Review 105 (2011): 298–315.  
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.13, 188; cf. On the Citizen, 1.3 
25 Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbesian Equality,” in Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S. A. Lloyd (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 76–112. 
26 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.13. 
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generated by recognition-seeking, and not Aristotle’s alleged “mutual human benevolence” can 
provide the foundation for any “large and lasting society”.27 The Gordian Knot resulting from the 
opposition between pride and equality is only cut once men promise, one to another, to obey a 
superior (the Leviathan), to whose authority they are all equally subject.28  
The awful “mortal God” instils fear in those in whom the desire for recognition is 
strongest, thereby emancipating the more modest from their fear of the vainglorious. By means of 
the penalties of civil law and the monopolisation of the apparatuses of socialization (the pulpit, 
universities and printing press), the sovereign constrains and educates subjects to acknowledge 
their natural equality as men. As citizens, some individuals might legitimately lay claim to honour 
from others. Yet Hobbes laboured the point – and his sovereign is required to labour the point – 
that this claim to esteem it is not theirs by right on account of their superior endowments or 
achievements. It is enjoyed solely at the free grace and discretion of the sovereign, the fount of all 
honour in the commonwealth. As king of the children of pride, Hobbes’s Leviathan must carefully 
superintend the economy of esteem in the commonwealth, with an extent of vision that enables it 
to monitor the “signes of respect” men “give to one another” even in “private meetings”.29 Unlike 
his celestial archetype, the sovereign need not be able to read men’s hearts; but like the prisoners 
of Bentham’s Panopticon, his subjects must always feel his eyes upon them, and regulate their every 
expression of esteem (for themselves, and for others) according to his will.  
On Hobbes’s interpretation, then, the desire for recognition as an expression of pride 
precludes men in their natural condition from acknowledging their mutual equality, and their 
mutual accountability to a shared law. This law is the law of nature, given to mankind by their 
Creator and promulgating precepts that include the duty laid out most clearly in the Gospel: to love 
one’s neighbour as oneself. Hobbes argued that recognition-seekers, desirous of dominion over 
others, refused to acknowledge the reciprocal duties inscribed in natural law. Consequently, the 
more “modest” and “tractable” were only obligated to adhere to natural law “in foro interno” – “he 
that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them” – but “in foro externo, that is, to putting them 
in act, not alwayes”. To act on such precepts might render the “modest” man “a prey to others” 
who refused to do likewise, and “procure his own certaine ruine” – in contravention of the 
fundamental duty under natural law of self-preservation.30 It followed that “the Lawes of Nature 
[…], in the condition of meer Nature […], are not properly Lawes”, but merely “qualities” that if 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 1.2. 
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.17; see Joshua Mitchell, “Hobbes and the Equality of the All under the One,” Political Theory 21 
(1993): 78–100.  
29 Hobbes, Leviathan 2.18, 276–80. 
30 Ibid., 1.15, 240. 
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followed by all would “dispose men to peace, and to obedience”.31 Prior to their promulgation by 
the sovereign in civil law, natural law lacks the sanctions of reward and punishment that make 
compliance in the interest of every individual. 
 But might the desire for recognition, if interpreted in a different light, facilitate rather 
than preclude men’s acknowledgement in foro interno of their reciprocal duties under natural law? 
Might esteem and contempt not be considered as sanctions that also incentivize compliance in foro 
externo, and thus make natural law truly a law in our pre-political condition? Hobbes canvassed both 
possibilities, only to discount them for reasons already discussed: the “Desire of Praise, disposeth 
[Men] to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgment they value”.32 We only “value” the 
“judgment” of those more powerful than ourselves – and not the judgment of all mankind equally.33 
This means that our desire for esteem induces us to act in ways that are deemed good by particular 
individuals because such actions conduce to their personal benefit, rather than to the mutual benefit 
of all members of our community. Consequently, the sanctions of praise and contempt might only 
incite a competition to excel one another in the performance of our reciprocal moral duties – “the 
most noble and profitable contention possible” – within a commonwealth, in which the sovereign 
determines what is estimable and contemptible.34 Even here, however, there is no guarantee that 
the sanctions of praise and contempt will reliably enforce the precepts of natural law. The sovereign 
might legitimately command us to honour those who, in our view, signally fail to embody these 
precepts in their conduct and character (this might include the deity, if the sovereign is not a 
Christian).35 The price of peace, and a necessary condition for the realization of sociability, might 
be hypocrisy: professing our esteem for those for whom, in secret, we have nothing but contempt.36  
 
 
Pufendorf and Locke: Esteem, Interdependence and Sociability 
 
The desire for others’ esteem occupies a central role in the accounts of human motivation offered 
by Pufendorf and Locke. Pufendorf’s aim was not to articulate a comprehensive account of human 
psychology but to demonstrate and systematize the norms and institutions that natural law 
demands. Therefore, his reflections on the desire for esteem are found scattered throughout his 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 2.26, 418. 
32 Ibid., 1.11, 152: italics added.  
33 Ibid., 1.10, 142.  
34 Ibid., 1.11, 154. 
35 Ibid., 1.16, 272. 
36 For Hobbes and hypocrisy see David Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 16–44. 
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works (most signifigantly, in the monumental De jure naturae et gentium (1672)). With the notable 
exception of Kari Saastamoinen, scholars have overlooked Pufendorf’s analysis of how esteem-
seeking and esteem-giving may lead people to adopt the norms of sociability.37 Locke’s explanation 
of the cognitive and behavioural implications of the desire for esteem is at once more systematic 
and comprehensive, and his rich private manuscripts offer us privileged access to the development 
of his thinking on this question.38 A number of commentators have emphasized Locke’s interest 
in how the desire for recognition shapes our actions and opinions. They have, however, either 
assumed that Locke considers this to be a bad thing – custom and opinion lead us away from the 
dictates of reason and natural law – or focused upon it to show that the liberalism bequeathed to 
us by Locke requires a social conformity that bleaches us of spontaneity, moral autonomy and 
subjectivity.39 A consideration of Pufendorf’s and Locke’s interpretations of the desire for esteem 
as engaging critically with Hobbes’s theory yields rather different insights. For both philosophers, 
as indeed for Hobbes, this desire opens individuals up to the evaluative judgments of their 
neighbours in ways that might potentially be positive or negative, depending on the criteria we use 
to evaluate merit and worth. 
  Although their proximity to Hobbes is contested, Pufendorf and Locke both 
accepted many of his fundamental presuppositions about human nature. In seventeenth-century 
Europe, no one focused more on the nature, origins and sustainability of sociability in large 
societies than Pufendorf. Pufendorf assumes in man a natural inclination for society (appetitus 
societatis); but he denies that this prompts them to establish civil society, because man can satisfy 
this appetite in smaller, pre-political communities “by the friendship whereby he is joined to his 
equals”.40 Although nature has “established a general sort of friendship between men”, people enter 
society in search of honour and advantage.41 Moreover, as had Hobbes, Pufendorf observed that 
the “struggle for honour and dignity” is unique to human beings, and stimulates an “envy, rivalry 
and hatred” that potentially leads them to transgress even the clearest dictates of natural law (not 
                                                          
37 Kari Saastamoinen, The Morality of the Fallen Man: Samuel Pufendorf on Natural Law (Helsinki: Societas Historica 
Finlandiae, 1995), 149–158. For Pufendorf’s analysis of the reactive attitude of resentment if someone questions our 
status as a human being, see Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf on Natural Equality,” 55–62. For more recent analysis of the 
desire for esteem in Pufendorf’s theory of sociability, see Haara, Pufendorf’s Theory of Sociability, 99–136. 
38 For extensive discussion of the content of those manuscripts see Stuart-Buttle, “A Burthen”.   
39 For the former approach, see Ruth Grant, “John Locke on Custom’s Power and Reason’s Authority,” Review of Politics 
74 (2012): 607–29. For the latter, Foucauldian reading see Tully, “Governing Conduct”; and Uday Singh Mehta, The 
Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
40 Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, ed. Frank Böhling (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), 7.1.3/ Samuel 
Pufendorf, The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, trans. Michael J. Seidler and ed. Craig L. Carr (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 203–4. The original Latin text is cited first, separated by a forward slash from the translation.  
41 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium 2.3.18 (our translation).  
9 
 
least that of sociality).42 In a similar vein, Locke routinely denounced “Pride and Ambition” as 
generative of “Covetousness”, “Rapine”, “Discord” and “Contention”.43 Neither denied the 
Augustinian insight, developed by Hobbes, that pride gives rise to a violent “lust for mastery” 
[dominandi libido dominatur].44 As Locke observed, none of God’s other “Creatures are half so wilful 
and proud, or half so desirous to be Masters of themselves and others, as Man”.45 Thus animated 
by wilful self-love, Pufendorf and Locke agreed with Hobbes that there could be no “Peace without 
Subjection”: the laws of nature required for peace and sociability, and enjoining the reciprocal 
duties of justice and social virtue, are in many respects “contrary to our natural Passions, that carry 
us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like”.46 It was evident to Locke as early as 1659 that if every 
man were left at liberty to guide his actions according to his own will (or “private morals”), sociable 
living would be impossible.47 In An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), Locke returned to 
this theme: “Men’s Appetites, if left to their full swing” would “carry Men to the over-turning of 
all Morality”.48 For sociability to be realized, Pufendorf and Locke agreed that an external constraint 
(law) was required to bridle the recalcitrant passions that otherwise directed men’s wills and brought 
them into conflict. Only thus might mankind live as God decreed that they ought: in peace and 
mutual fellowship. 
 While both Pufendorf and Locke recognized that sociability requires obedience to 
political authority and the rules of justice it promulgates and enforces, they denied that Hobbes’s 
(political) solution was adequate to address the problem that he had identified. The civil law, 
enforced by civil sanctions, might constrain men to refrain from harming one another, but it could 
not incentivize them to perform the reciprocal duties of social morality that give rise to the deeper 
ties of affection and kinship upon which social life depends.  Like Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that 
the origin of political society “lay not in the mutual good-will of men, but in their mutual fear”. 
Moreover, like Hobbes, he did not think that men are turned into social and political animals merely 
through political coercion and the fear of punishment.49 After the establishment of civil society, 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 7.2.4/ Samuel Pufendorf Of the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Charles H. Oldfather and William A. Oldfather 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 969.  
43 John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010), 11, 26, 40. 
44 Augustine of Hippo, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. Robert W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), Preface, 3. 
45 John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, ed. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), §35, 139. 
46 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2.17, 254–6. 
47 Locke to William Godolphin, Aug. 1659, in The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E.S. de Beer, 8 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976–89), i, 64–6. 
48 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.3.13.  
49 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium/ Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 214. For Hobbes’s views on education, see S. 
A. Lloyd, “Coercion, Ideology, and Education in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John 
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the sovereign’s duty is to teach subjects to act in conformity to the law of sociability “not so much 
from fear of punishments as from habit (assuetudo)”.50 While critiquing the Aristotelian notion of 
zoon politikon, Pufendorf nonetheless contended that in a more limited sense man can “be said to 
be by nature a political animal”, because once political societies have been established “men 
become accustomed in them to live a decent civil life”.51 Pufendorf follows Hobbes by advocating 
the sovereign’s duty to educate his subjects to civil obedience. Yet, the important difference 
between the two philosophers is that, for Pufendorf, processes of socialisation and habituation in 
many cases lie (and ought to lie) outside of the sovereign’s reach. In civil society, people learn to 
act sociably as a result of their iterative mutual interactions: a process that cannot be understood 
exclusively in terms of political governance. Justice is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
sociability, as Pufendorf observed: 
 
It is not enough, however, not to have hurt another, or not to have deprived him of the esteem he is 
owed: These only remove the just cause for hatred. Something good must also be conferred on the 
other, at least if the minds of men are to be conjoined by a still closer bond. Someone who has not 
driven me away from himself by some hostile or ungrateful deed has not discharged the debt of 
sociality; rather, he should furnish something beneficial so that I am glad that others who share my 
nature also live upon this earth. And, as well, the affinity and kinship established among men by 
nature must be exercised by means of mutual duties.52 
 
Locke was animated by a similar concern, declaring that:  
 
We must not content our selves with the narrow Measures of bare Justice. Charity, Bounty and 
Liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins; this Reason directs; and this that natural 
Fellowship we are born into requires of us.53 
 
On Hobbes’s account the law of nature only acquires the status of a law, the precepts of 
which are obligatory in performance rather than merely endeavour, when promulgated in the form 
of civil law.54 Concerned to secure peace, the magistrate necessarily focuses on the enforcement of 
justice: it is hard to see how, by means of civil penalties, men might be induced actively to do good 
to one another, rather than merely restrained from doing harm. As the above citation from 
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Pufendorf indicates, a basic respect for one’s fellow men as one’s equals might be a prerequisite 
for justice; but it is the desire for preferential esteem from others that animates us to labour for 
their happiness. Here Pufendorf made an important distinction between two types of esteem: 
“simple” (existimatio simplex) and “intensive” (existimatio intensiva).55 In the domain of simple esteem, 
an act of recognition means considering the other as a good man who has some value in social life: 
it implies the right to be treated by others not as “a dog or beast, but as much a man as you”.56 For 
“affinity and kinship” to be “established among men”, however, a more generous and positive act 
in the realm of recognition – that of “intensive” esteem – is required. This involves the free 
acknowledgement of another as an individual who has exercised his will in ways the admirer deems 
worthy of admiration and praise. Pufendorf does not deny that some forms of intensive esteem, 
such as those signified by honorific titles or public office, will rely on the arbitrary decision of the 
sovereign. He is nonetheless concerned to create social space for a sphere of intensive estimation 
that relies on the voluntary judgements of men and lies outside of the jurisdiction of the sovereign. 
Unlike on Hobbes’s interpretation, in seeking preferential esteem we have no choice but to 
accommodate ourselves to others’ judgments of our value, rather than coerce others to accept our 
subjective (and inflated) sense of our own worth and merit. It follows that the quest for preferential 
esteem generates shared norms of propriety to which all men, desirous of esteem, recognise 
themselves to be beholden – rather than, as for Hobbes, precluding this possibility.  
In labouring the point that preferential esteem cannot be coerced from others, Pufendorf 
explicitly identified Hobbes’s treatment of honour in chapter 10 of Leviathan as his target. Due to 
our psychological make-up, “intensive esteem” only matters to us – it only gives us pleasure – to 
the extent that we recognize it to be sincere. “The mere external signs of honour”, Pufendorf 
declared, “unless they arise from the submission of the mind, are empty things”. This “submission 
of the mind” cannot be “forced from a man” even by “the power of sovereignty” and on pain of 
death.57 Whereas Hobbes had no problem basing practices of honour in fear, Pufendorf argued 
that coerced, insincere esteem is worthless: “things which may be extorted by force have no such 
power to win the hearts of others, as those which may be denied without fear”.58 In any case, we 
are incapable of concealing the spontaneous sentiments we experience when judging and/or being 
judged by others, because blushing and other involuntary corporeal signs reveal our true 
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sentiments.59 As Locke similarly observed, “the Physiognomy of the Mind” renders our sentiments 
legible to others, even if it is most transparent in children.60 
Locke extended this logic into the realm of divine worship: for the “esteem” we profess in 
worship to be “pleasing unto God”, it must express “the inward and full perswasion of the mind”; 
otherwise, through our “Hypocrisie” we exhibit a “Contempt for his Divine Majesty”.61 The mere 
pretence of esteem, in religion as in civil life, frustrates the end we seek in offering it: the good 
opinion of others. We are all acutely sensitive, as Hobbes emphasized, to contempt, due to what 
Pufendorf termed the “very delicate” character of our “self-esteem” (sui estimatio), which leads us 
to desire affirmation from others.62 For Pufendorf, it is clear evidence of man’s social nature that 
“every good man takes the greatest delight in distinguishing himself among his fellows by worthy 
deeds”.63 As Locke observed, this “quick sence of Reputation” explains our acute sensitivity 
(“Tenderness”) to others’ opinions of our merit and worth – opinions that, try though they might, 
they cannot conceal or feign.64 As Locke reflected in his private journals, it was indisputable that 
the first question most men ask, “in all things he doth, or undertakes” is “how will this render me 
to my Company, and those, whose esteeme I value?”.65 If the sovereign could, as Hobbes implied, 
to a great extent dictate to men the criteria by which they ought to esteem one another, then this 
would give him a remarkable power over his subjects.66 Yet the sovereign both lacked this power 
in practice, and any claim to it in theory: it was no part of his jurisdiction to impose upon men’s 
consciences in the realms of either civil or divine esteem, because such imposition was unnecessary 
to secure the end (peace and security) for which authority had been entrusted to him.67 
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Aside from enforcing the rules of justice, for Locke men’s consciences did not need to be 
constrained by political means in the moral realm, because they were already subject to discipline by 
alternative and more powerful constraints. As he noted in the Essay, civil law is strictly limited in 
both its coercive and imaginative efficacy: it cannot regulate men’s conduct in private, nor can it 
compel them to behave in ways that exhibit much consideration for the wishes and needs of others. 
In the moral realm, it is the desire for esteem that (to borrow from Hobbes) forges “Unity” out of 
“Multitude” and creates a common will (law) to which all men recognize themselves beholden – 
and not their mutual subjection to the sovereign.68 The pursuit of esteem habituates us into norms 
of propriety that are produced endogenously within societies on account of their communal utility. 
To secure esteem one must abide by these norms, encoded in what Locke called the “Law of 
Opinion or Reputation”. It is this “Law” that regulates the realm of social morality and incentivizes 
men to perform their reciprocal ‘imperfect’ duties. As Locke declared, “he who imagines 
Commendation and Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to 
the Opinions and Rules of those, with whom they converse, seems little skill’d in the Nature, or 
History of Mankind”.69 Locke imposed a categorical distinction between the “Hobbist” (civil) law 
and the “Law of Reputation” due not merely to their different modes of operation, but to their 
discrete jurisdictions. The civil law promulgates and polices the negative (‘perfect’) duties of justice, 
whilst the “Law of Reputation” disseminates the positive (‘imperfect’) duties of social morality and 
enforces them with sanctions that are not physically coercive, and yet exercise the greatest power 
over men’s minds: esteem and contempt.70 As Locke observed as early as 1675, “Mankinde is 
supported in the ways of Vertue and Vice by the Society he is of, & the Conversation he keeps; 
Example and Fashion being the great Governours of this Worlde”.71 
Insofar as the “Law of Reputation” issues from and is enforced by all members of society 
collectively, so it tends “to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that, wherein every one finds his 
Advantage; and to blame and discountenance the contrary”.72 It encapsulates a corporate (or 
public) reason which can identify – as the subjective, self-loving individual could not – what is 
necessary for the collective well-being of all members of society. Viewed in this light, the desire for 
esteem has, so to speak, been hardwired into human nature by God, and for a purpose: to induce 
us to acknowledge what, in the opening pages of the Second Treatise, Locke calls our “Obligation to 
mutual Love”.73 Our concern for esteem, as for Pufendorf, makes us inescapably interdependent 
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creatures: we rely upon one another to secure the mental good that all of us recognize to be essential 
to our happiness. This brings the Golden Rule home to mankind, because what Pufendorf termed 
our “delicate self-esteem” – our self-love – is dependent upon the esteem and love of our 
neighbours: “If then happinesse be our interest end & business, ’tis evident the way to it is to love 
our neighbour as our self, for by that means we enlarge & secure our pleasures, since then all the 
good we doe to them redoubles upon our selves & gives us an undecaying & uninterrupted 
pleasure”.74 This providential process is likely to be disturbed if the sovereign determines, as 
Hobbes decreed he ought, to interfere with the “Law of Reputation”: it is for this reason that Locke 
advanced what he recognized to be the “strange” doctrine that the civil magistrate “hath nothing 
to do with moral virtues and vices”, nor ought to “prescribe any rules about them, but leave them 
entirely to the discretion and consciences of his people”.75 “People” here assuredly means the 
collective body – society – and not every individual; and Locke’s claim relies upon the conviction 
that such a “people” already have a “rule” to guide them to which they subject their individual wills: 
the “Law of Reputation”. If left to operate as it ought, this “Law” will contain moral precepts that 
are likely to be consistent with those of natural law, given to man by God for their terrestrial well-
being as well as His eternal glory. Since “nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with 
Esteem and Reputation that, wherein every one finds his Advantage; and to blame and 
discountenance the contrary: ’tis no Wonder, that Esteem and Discredit, Vertue and Vice, should 
in a great measure every-where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which 
the Law of God hath established”.76 
On Locke’s account, the “Law of Reputation” is generated prior to, as well as independent of 
civil law. This underpins Locke’s claim in the Treatises that, contrary to Hobbes’s assumption, men 
do have a rule to guide them in their natural condition: natural law, as discovered by men through 
their mutual interactions. This “Law” provides criteria by which to evaluate the merit of people 
and actions that are not subjective. Through processes of socialization and habituation, members 
of a society accept these criteria of good and ill as their own and evaluate their own actions, rather 
than merely those of others accordingly. There is no Hobbesian distinction between the internal 
and external forums here. Children, as Locke emphasized in his educational writings, might initially 
learn to act in particular ways because doing so wins them praise, but they will eventually do so 
because they consider such actions to be by their very nature good and obligatory.77 Insofar as the 
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precepts of the “Law of Reputation” tend to be consistent with natural law, so they are also in 
harmony with the moral law contained in the Gospels: upon the reading of which men will discover 
the true foundation of all morality in God’s will and command. If the sovereign interferes with the 
“Law of Reputation”, he obstructs the social processes by which the individual is disciplined in such 
ways as render him a sociable, morally accountable creature, capable of government. This is why, 
in both the Essay and Treatises, Locke labours the point that individuals must be left at liberty to 
esteem one another as they see fit. In direct contradiction to Hobbes’s theory (and, to some extent, 
Pufendorf’s), for Locke we retain an inalienable right as members of communities collectively to 
define standards of moral good and ill. We also retain the right to punish transgressions of these 
moral norms. Even if we give up to the sovereign our natural right to employ coercive force to punish 
transgressions of natural law, we remain empowered to employ the (powerful) sanctions of esteem 
and contempt. Citizens “retain still the power of Thinking well or ill; approving or disapproving of 
the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: And by this approbation and 





If Hobbes’s solution to the problem of sociability was emphatically political in nature, he was 
nonetheless keenly aware that society generates other forces that shape and constrain the 
individual’s appetites and desires in complex ways. Hobbes identified the desire for recognition as 
a primary reason why the individual is so susceptible to these currents; and he maintained that they 
might act on subjects in ways that reliably conduce to peace – the ultimate aim of Hobbes’s political 
philosophy – only if harnessed and regulated by the sovereign. The sociability debate after Hobbes 
invites the thought that Hobbes’s diagnosis of the problem was considered to be far more 
compelling, and convincing, than his solution to it. 
Pufendorf and Locke, at least, appear to have held this view. They could agree with Hobbes 
that man is, by nature, animated by self-love, and that it is the desire to have this love affirmed by 
others (rather than natural benevolence) that induces him to seek society. They could similarly 
agree with Hobbes that self-love appears to preclude the possibility that individuals might 
voluntarily choose to benefit others unless they stand to gain by doing so. As Pufendorf observed, 
“not just anyone has such goodness of character as to be willing to do all the things by which he 
can benefit others out of humanity or charity alone, without a well-founded hope of receiving an 
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equivalent in return”.79 Yet, for Locke and Pufendorf, there is an “equivalent” that attends such 
other-regarding conduct: the reward of esteem, the most pleasing “good” of all. Such esteem, 
contrary to Hobbes’s claims, cannot be extorted from others by force or fraud: it must be earned, 
by acting in ways that appear meritorious to the esteem-giver. The desire for esteem makes men 
inherently interdependent creatures. The mental good they consider to be most essential to their 
happiness – esteem – requires them to treat others as they would be treated: to love their neighbour 
as they love themselves. Pufendorf and Locke made no effort to rehabilitate the doctrine of natural 
benevolence, as Francis Hutcheson would later; instead, they endeavoured to show that self-love 
can, and must, give rise to friendships characterized by mutual equality and reciprocity. Only thus 
might we self-loving creatures secure the end – the esteem and love of others – that we seek in 
entering society.  
For Locke and Pufendorf, then, a broadly Hobbesian anthropology demanded not a denial 
of the very possibility that men are capable of sincere friendship and “mutual Love”, but rather a 
new purportedly (non-Aristotelian) explanation of how they become such creatures in the course of 
their iterative mutual interactions in society. This process, as Locke’s writings show most clearly, 
remains contingent: the criteria by which we learn to evaluate the merit and worth of actions and 
characters (ourselves included) might all too easily become corrupted in pathological societies. If 
citizens are encouraged to value one another on the basis of their speculative opinions in religion 
rather than their moral conduct (as in intolerant “Christian commonwealths”), or to mistake 
material for moral worth (in advanced commercial societies), the harmony between social esteem 
and moral performance will assuredly be disturbed. But the cause of any such corruption would 
need to be found in defective social and political institutions, and not – as Hobbes was held to 
maintain – in human nature itself. This insight was further developed in the eighteenth century by 
those philosophers, such as Hume and Smith, who foregrounded the importance of processes of 
socialization and habituation in the development of the moral personality.  
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